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ABSTRACT 
  In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court 
endorsed the proposition that the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment might operate as a constraint not only on executive and 
legislative action, but also on judicial decisions. In a federal system in 
which property rights are established almost exclusively by state law, 
and in which the meaning of state law is determined by state courts, 
the notion of judicial takings raises several difficult questions. The 
question that is the province of this Note is whether a doctrine of 
judicial takings might somehow inhibit the development of the 
common law of property in state courts. This Note identifies two 
principal mechanisms by which that inhibiting effect might occur. 
First, the Court might insist on enshrining an authorized definition of 
constitutional property with certain approved, substantive features 
rather than simply leaving the content of property rights to be defined 
by state law. Second, the Court might ostensibly leave the 
development of property law to state courts while nevertheless 
adopting an overly aggressive posture in reviewing state property-law 
decisions: it might, in other words, be swift to hold that a state court 
decision had affirmatively changed, rather than merely explicated, the 
state law of property. This Note concludes that although the first 
possibility is nominally foreclosed by the Court’s commitment to 
positivism, when reviewing especially difficult or novel property cases 
the Court may nevertheless be tempted to patch together a definition 
Copyright © 2011 by David S. Wheelock. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Yale College, B.A. 2009. I would 
like to thank Professor Jedediah Purdy for his wonderful insights and abiding patience in 
guiding me through the process of writing this Note. I would also like to convey my gratitude for 
the help of Leigh Krahenbuhl and all the other editors of the Duke Law Journal. Special thanks 
go to my family and Sylvana Hidalgo for their love and support. 
WHEELOCK IN PRINTER PROOF 10/13/2011  9:52:12 AM 
434 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:433 
 
of property that borrows from the traditional substance of the 
common law. And although the second possibility is not an 
implausible one, Stop the Beach Renourishment suggested that 
plaintiffs in judicial takings challenges should bear the burden of 
establishing the prior existence of the allegedly extinguished property 
right. That suggestion, this Note argues, may ultimately preserve a 
great deal of interpretive freedom for state courts in adjudicating less-
settled questions of property law. The Court’s choices in these delicate 
areas will ultimately dictate whether judicial takings either preserves 
or imperils the common law of property. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment1 has been described 
as “a last lonely bulwark of property rights.”2 It is, at bottom, an 
obstinate limit on the government’s ability to alter private-property 
entitlements without shouldering the burden of repayment.3 But the 
clause’s meaning and operation are complicated by the fact that 
property rights within the constitutional system are understood to be 
largely a function of state law.4 Given the accepted role of the state 
courts in defining state law,5 and given that even the most cautious 
property-rights advocates acknowledge the capacity of state common 
law to change over time,6 the question naturally announces itself: 
Might a state court interpretation of state property law venture so far 
afield from established precedent as to constitute a “taking” of 
property in its own right? In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 2. Landgate, Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1212 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J., 
dissenting). 
 3. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1990) 
(asserting that the Fifth Amendment serves to “limit the degree to which legislative and 
executive bodies can reshuffle property rights without compensating injured property holders”). 
 4. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 487 
(6th ed. 2009) (“The cases take the view that, in general, the question whether a ‘property’ 
interest exists is governed by state law.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional 
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 917–22 (2000) (discussing the ascendancy of the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on state law to define property). 
 5. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 611–12 (1874). 
 6. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years 
After Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 23–24 (2008) (recognizing some flexibility in the articulation of 
the common law but arguing for a “demand-side” approach informed by social custom rather 
than a “supply-side” approach dictated by policy preferences). 
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Florida Department of Environmental Protection,7 decided in 2010, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court responded in the affirmative.8 Judicial 
takings, once a topic upon which scholars only speculated,9 suddenly 
emerged as a live field of inquiry. 
Notwithstanding the plurality’s firmness in recognizing judicial 
takings, Stop the Beach Renourishment inspired no small degree of 
confusion as to whether the concept might eventually be endorsed by 
a majority of the Court10 and as to what form a judicial takings 
doctrine might assume in that event.11 This Note strives to bring some 
organization to the discussion by focusing on a specific problem 
raised by Stop the Beach Renourishment: the prospect that a judicial 
takings doctrine might inhibit the ongoing development of the 
common law of property in state courts. Critics have raised this issue 
in response to the plurality opinion without engaging in a great deal 
of elaboration.12 As this Note emphasizes, the concern over freezing 
the common law does have a substantial genealogy within the Court’s 
jurisprudence, one that makes the accusation especially germane to 
the plurality’s exposition of judicial takings.13 The ambition of this 
Note is to assess the merits of that accusation more thoroughly. 
Part I sketches a brief doctrinal pedigree of judicial takings, with 
a special eye trained on the potential of a judicial takings doctrine to 
inhibit the development of the common law of property. First, Part 
I.A seeks to define the central problem with greater precision. It 
 7. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 8. See id. at 2601 (plurality opinion) (“It would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial 
decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”). 
 9. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1451 (“Whether the takings protections constrain the 
judiciary in the same manner that they restrict the other branches of government is a crucial 
question today.”). 
 10. See Richard Ruda, Essay, Do We Really Need a Judicial Takings Doctrine?, 35 VT. L. 
REV. 451, 451 (2010) (“There is . . . no need for the Supreme Court to adopt a new takings 
doctrine that substantially alters the federal-state balance by making federal courts the arbiters 
of state property law.”); Daniel L. Siegel, Essay, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial 
Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 460 (2010) (“[I]t is highly doubtful that on closer 
examination a majority of the current Justices would ever embrace the doctrine.”). 
 11. See Robert H. Thomas, Mark M. Murakami & Tred R. Eyerly, Essay, Of Woodchucks 
and Prune Yards: A View of Judicial Takings from the Trenches, 35 VT. L. REV. 437, 442 (2010) 
(proposing “a roadmap for analyzing judicial takings claims”). 
 12. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 261 (2011), http://yalelaw
journal.org/2011/2/18/mulvaney.html (arguing that extending judicial takings to cover the 
adjudication of rights between private parties would “freeze[] evolution of the common law of 
property absent compensation”); Siegel, supra note 10, at 465 (“[A] judicial takings doctrine 
would ignore the evolving nature of the common law.”). 
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
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styles the problem as a conversation between Justice Scalia and 
Justice Stevens that originated in the Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council,14 and it further explains why the 
conversation had a natural forum in the pages of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment. Part I.B then presents the procedural history and the 
various opinions from Stop the Beach Renourishment. 
In Parts II and III, this Note engages with two basic ways in 
which a judicial takings doctrine, if indeed adopted by the Court, 
might freeze the common law of property. Part II focuses on what is 
perhaps best described as the substantive task of identifying property. 
It inquires whether the Court might be willing to enshrine a specific 
normative definition of property as a constitutional baseline in 
takings cases by giving recognition to certain kinds of common-law 
property principles but not to others. Part II suggests that “property” 
in the Takings Clause is likely to continue to be defined by state 
positive law, but that the Court may reserve some body of general 
common law as a definitional failsafe. Part III, by comparison, seeks 
to ascertain what procedural approach the Court might take in 
evaluating judicial takings claims regardless of how property is 
substantively defined. Using Stop the Beach Renourishment as an 
imperfect guide, it inquires into what extent, and under what 
conditions, the Court might be read to permit state courts to modify 
or reinterpret common-law principles of property without triggering 
the Fifth Amendment’s compensation requirement. The plurality’s 
discussion contained mixed signals: some of the Justices seem to 
counsel a deferential approach, whereas others might be read to 
encourage judicial discipline. 
The two categories of analysis represented by Parts II and III will 
almost certainly overlap in places. Underlying each of them, after all, 
is the sensitive challenge of devising a path that will both preserve the 
Takings Clause as a meaningful feature of the Constitution and honor 
the state courts’ position as the final expositors of state property law. 
Vexing though that challenge may be, a judicial takings doctrine that 
does not attempt to resolve it is liable to resemble a “bewildering 
mess,”15 as neither litigants nor state courts will have any reliable 
means of predicting exactly when a commonplace property dispute 
 14. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 15. James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1997) 
(summarizing the confusion over the Court’s regulatory-takings jurisprudence). 
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might rise to the level of a constitutional claim.16 At the very least, 
this Note aims to illuminate some of the tensions that will 
predominate in any nascent judicial takings regime, in the modest 
hope that the future architects—or excavators—of such a regime 
might do their work by a br
I.  A DOCTRINAL PEDIGREE OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS 
On their face, the opinions in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
disclose significant disagreements among the Justices about the 
potential operation of the Takings Clause on judicial action. Those 
opinions, and indeed the broader history of the case, are worthy of 
attention in their own right. But exactly what the notion of judicial 
takings might mean for the future of the common law of property 
cannot fully be appreciated without first visiting an earlier exchange. 
A. The Fear of Freezing the Common Law 
Nearly twenty years prior to Stop the Beach Renourishment, in 
Lucas, the Court first gave formal recognition to the categorical rule 
that the Takings Clause requires compensation whenever a regulation 
denies a landowner “all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land.”17 The specific regulation challenged in Lucas was a South 
Carolina law that prohibited the erection of habitable structures on 
beachfront property seaward of a line fixed by the designated state 
agency.18 The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the 
statute effected no taking of beachfront property, and therefore 
required no compensation of beachfront property owners because it 
simply proscribed a harmful or noxious use of the land, thereby 
falling well within the accepted scope of the state’s police power.19 
 16. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2619 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring) (cautioning that the plurality’s position might spur a 
multitude of constitutional challenges to state court rulings). 
 17. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. As the Court acknowledged, this categorical rule was a 
departure from the “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” that had long been understood to 
precede any requirement of compensation under the Court’s prior takings jurisprudence. Id. 
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 18. Id. at 1008–09. 
 19. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 900 (S.C. 1991) (“[T]he fact remains 
that the Supreme Court has time and again held that when a State merely regulates use, and acts 
to prevent a serious public harm, there is no ‘taking’ for which compensation is due.”), rev’d, 
505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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Justice Scalia, writing for the Lucas majority, responded to this 
conclusion by attaching an important corollary to the Court’s newly 
adopted per se rule: when a government regulation prohibits all 
economically beneficial use of land, the government may avoid 
compensating the landowner only by showing that the landowner did 
not enjoy any right to undertake that use in the first place.20 That 
showing, Scalia’s opinion noted, must be supported by reference to 
whichever “background principles of the State’s law of property and 
nuisance” already imposed substantive limitations on the landowner’s 
title.21 
To a dissenting Justice Stevens, the Lucas Court’s reliance on the 
ability of background principles alone to limit compensation under 
the Takings Clause was misplaced.22 The mere fact that a government 
regulation renders impermissible what may have been a permissible 
use of property under the previous state of the law, Stevens 
contended, should not by itself create a basis for compensation under 
the Takings Clause.23 Rather, Stevens’s dissent emphasized the 
principle that state governments, in regulating private property rights, 
ought to be afforded some flexibility to respond to new social 
emergencies and to serve the evolving needs of the public.24 The 
principal transgression of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, according 
to Stevens, was that it “[froze] the State’s common law, denying the 
legislature much of its traditional power to revise the law governing 
the rights and uses of property.”25 Lest that folly escape the 
appropriate measure of condemnation, Stevens did not hesitate, in 
language borrowed from Justice Marshall, to invoke the specter of 
Lochner v. New York,26 a decision redolent of a jurisprudential era 
 20. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
 21. Id. at 1029. 
 22. See id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that legislatures “must often revise 
the definition of property and the rights of property owners”). 
 23. See id. at 1068 (“One must wonder if government will be able to ‘go on’ effectively if it 
must risk compensation ‘for every such change in the general law.’” (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922))). 
 24. See id. at 1069 (“More than a century ago we recognized that ‘the great office of 
statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the 
changes of time and circumstances.’” (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877))). 
 25. Id. at 1068–69. 
 26. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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“when common-law rights were also found immune from revision by 
State or Federal Government.”27 
The tenor of Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lucas made all the more 
noteworthy his absence from the deliberations in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, a decision in which Stevens took no part.28 Although 
all eight participating Justices agreed that the Florida Supreme Court 
had not violated the Takings Clause by deciding against private-
property owners in their challenge to a state erosion-control statute,29 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion took the significant step of asserting 
that a judicial decision might conceivably amount to a taking within 
the meaning of the clause.30 The plurality’s willingness to recognize 
judicial takings occasioned some trepidation from Justices Kennedy31 
and Breyer,32 who penned separate concurrences. But neither 
concurring opinion was quite so strident in evaluating Scalia’s 
arguments as to sound Stevens’s prior alarm against “freez[ing] the 
State’s common law.”33 
 27. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 28. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2613 
(2010). Although Justice Stevens gave no explanation for his recusal and no recusal motion was 
filed, before argument one of the amici curiae discovered and circulated documents indicating 
that Stevens owned a condominium property in Fort Lauderdale “within a renourishment zone 
similar to the property at issue in the case.” Tony Mauro, Behind Justice Stevens’ Recusal in 
Florida Case, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009, 1:41 PM), http://legaltimes.
typepad.com/blt/2009/12/behind-justice-stevens-recusal-in-florida-case.html. 
 29. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (plurality opinion). 
 30. See id. at 2602 (“[T]he Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property 
without paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.”). 
 31. See id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (contending that the Court need not 
determine “whether, or when, a judicial decision” might violate the Takings Clause and noting 
“certain difficulties that should be considered” before recognizing judicial takings). 
 32. See id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he plurality unnecessarily addresses 
questions of constitutional law that are better left for another day.”). 
 33. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1068 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Justice Kennedy seemed merely to suggest that the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1, would be better suited than the Takings Clause to guard against judicial 
encroachments on private property. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Due Process Clause, in both its substantive and procedural 
aspects, is a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial power.”). His concurrence was, at 
most, ambivalent toward the proposition that either state legislatures or state courts require any 
extraordinary degree of flexibility in shaping common-law background principles of property. 
See id. (“State courts generally operate under a common-law tradition that allows for 
incremental modifications to property law, but ‘this tradition cannot justify a carte blanch [sic] 
judicial authority to change property definitions wholly free of constitutional limitations.’” 
(quoting Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, 
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 435 (2001))). Justice Breyer, for his part, was at 
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Several considerations suggest that, had Justice Stevens been 
given the chance to reprise that alarm in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, he would have done so. For one thing, the majority 
opinion from which Stevens had so vigorously dissented in Lucas 
itself foreshadowed Justice Scalia’s future acknowledgment of judicial 
takings: in a final footnote in Lucas, Scalia cautioned that a state 
court could not be so expansive in its interpretation of background 
property-law principles as to depart from “an objectively reasonable 
application of relevant precedents.”34 Additionally, Stevens’s Lucas 
dissent was rhetorically indebted35 to Justice Marshall’s concurrence 
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,36 a case in which Marshall 
argued that extending Takings Clause doctrine to elevate the 
common-law right of exclusion above the right to free speech would 
potentially “freeze the common law” and plunge the Court back into 
the days of Lochner.37 When Scalia defended the notion of judicial 
takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment, he cited PruneYard as 
accommodating the very proposition that Marshall rebelled against: 
that an uncompensated judicial revision of private property rights 
might be struck down as violating the Takings Clause.38 That Stevens 
might have condemned Scalia’s reasoning on the same grounds first 
staked out by Marshall is, therefore, not implausible. 
But a reprisal of Justice Stevens’s Lucas dissent would have been 
pertinent to Stop the Beach Renourishment in the far more 
fundamental sense that the concept of judicial takings, if it is indeed 
to subsist as a cognizable feature of the Court’s Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence, will ultimately demand some resolution of the proper 
role of the common law in defining the background principles of 
property. After all, Lucas spoke only to the ability of legislatures to 
least somewhat solicitous of the possibility that a judicial takings doctrine might entail “federal 
interference in matters that are primarily the subject of state law,” but he did not appear to 
endorse any particular view of how mutable private property rights ought to be. Id. at 2618–19 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 34. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18. 
 35. See id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Such an approach would freeze the common 
law as it has been constructed by the courts, perhaps at its 19th-century state of development.” 
(quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))). 
 36. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 37. Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 38. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion) (“[The 
PruneYard opinion’s] failure to speak separately to the claimed [judicial] taking . . . certainly 
does not suggest that a taking by judicial action cannot occur, and arguably suggests that the 
same analysis applicable to taking by constitutional provision would apply.”). 
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reshuffle property rights within the existing framework of 
entitlements defined by the prevailing configuration of the law. A 
statute of the kind passed by South Carolina could constitute a taking 
only after courts had accepted that the regulated use or interest 
actually was property.39 As commentators note, both lower courts and 
government defendants have increasingly focused their analysis on 
background principles in post-Lucas takings cases. If a plaintiff enjoys 
no property right in a regulated interest, the litigation will be defeated 
at an early stage and the opportunity for a more involved inquiry into 
whether and to what extent the regulated interest was indeed taken 
will be foreclosed.40 
But the question of exactly what should qualify as a background 
principle after Lucas, and, by extension, which types of inherent 
limitations might circumscribe property ownership without the need 
for compensation, has not been the object of any widespread 
theoretical consensus beyond a few elementary propositions.41 To 
 39. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (“[W]e think [the state] may resist compensation only if the 
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use 
interests were not part of his title to begin with.” (emphasis added)); see also Michael C. Blumm 
& Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical 
Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325 (2005) (“Lucas thus elevated the task of 
defining the relevant property interest—what some have referred to as the ‘denominator’ 
question—to the role of a threshold inquiry.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” 
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967))). 
 40. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39, at 328 (suggesting that this “threshold inquiry” 
allows courts to “reduce the amount of information that they must process” and enables the 
government to obtain early dismissals of takings challenges); see also id. at 335 & nn.80–86 
(collecting cases in which both state and federal courts have been receptive to government 
takings defenses based on background principles). 
 41. The right of exclusion, at least, seems to be a central and uncontroversial feature of 
most accounts of property in the takings context. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 970 (“The 
statement . . . that the hallmark of property is the right to exclude others should be adopted as 
part of the definition of property for takings clause purposes.”); Walston, supra note 33, at 404 
(“In takings cases, the Supreme Court has held that ‘property’ is not a monolithic economic 
interest, but instead is a ‘bundle of rights,’ the most important of which is the ‘right to 
exclude’ . . . .” (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); PruneYard, 447 U.S. 
at 82; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))). Although most commentators 
appear to accept the notion that traditional common-law rules of nuisance will provide inherent 
limitations on title, scholars are by no means in agreement as to how susceptible those rules 
should be to modification or expansion by either courts or legislatures. Compare, e.g., Blumm & 
Ritchie, supra note 39, at 336 (“Because nuisance law is continuously expanding, new 
knowledge concerning the value of particular resources may bar liability for acts which have not 
historically been considered to be common law nuisances.”), and Frank I. Michelman, Property, 
Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 301, 316 (1993) (proposing that the capacity of common-law nuisance to change 
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recognize the Takings Clause as supplying an independent constraint 
on the antecedent judicial definition of property, then, might be to 
thrust upon federal courts the novel and delicate responsibility of 
discriminating between those portions of state court jurisprudence 
that effect some affirmative change to the state’s property law and 
those portions that represent merely an explication of the law. One 
conceivable result, especially if federal courts were to carry out that 
duty aggressively, could be the instillation in state judiciaries of a 
greater reluctance to disturb or depart from established tenets of the 
traditional common law, in much the same way that Justice Stevens 
feared Lucas would dissuade legislatures from any attempt to revise 
existing property entitlements.42 
Stop the Beach Renourishment thus invites reflection on how a 
judicial takings doctrine might implicate Justice Stevens’s concern 
about freezing the common law. Justice Scalia’s opinion did not 
engage with this concern directly, but his discussion offered a helpful, 
if incomplete, roadmap as to how the Court might choose to resolve 
some important preliminary questions if it were to adopt a theory of 
judicial takings more wholeheartedly.43 Before the problem can be 
embarked upon in earnest, a brief exposition of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment itself will be useful for understanding the types of 
circumstances under which judicial takings claims might occur. 
over time might itself be considered a background principle), with Huffman, supra note 6, at 27 
(“[I]t is a distortion of the common law process to suggest that state courts and legislatures can 
modify or abandon established common law principles in the name of present day notions of the 
public interest and public rights.”). Nor do commentators entirely agree as to whether inherent 
limitations on property rights might be derived from alternative sources of law in addition to 
common-law nuisance doctrine. Compare, e.g., Walston, supra note 33, at 402–03 (“[T]he Lucas 
Court appeared to embrace a general distinction between state common law—which normally 
provides ‘background’ principles of law—and state legislative enactments, which normally do 
not.”), with Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent 
Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996) (arguing that background principles should 
not be limited to the common law and may include statutes passed prior to a landowner’s 
acquisition of property). 
 42. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens’s fear that Lucas 
would erode the legislature’s traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of 
property). 
 43. One line in the plurality opinion that might have contained the germ of a fuller 
response to the criticism that a judicial takings doctrine would freeze the common law was 
Justice Scalia’s comment that “in any case, courts have no peculiar need of flexibility.” Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion). 
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B. Anatomy of a Claimed Judicial Taking 
Ironically, the claimed judicial taking in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment began not with an initial defeat for private-property 
owners, but with an initial victory.44 Florida’s Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act45 authorizes local governments, upon permission 
from the state’s Department of Environmental Protection, to initiate 
erosion-control projects along beachfront properties.46 These projects 
frequently entail the addition of dry sand to permanently submerged 
coastal lands, which are traditionally held in public trust by the 
state—as opposed to the land above the mean high-water line, which 
is owned by the private-property owners.47 In such situations, 
pursuant to statute, Florida’s Board of Trustees of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund established an “erosion-control line,” which 
was typically identical to the preexisting high-water line.48 The 
erosion-control line, once fixed by the Board, continued to define the 
boundary between the state’s land and the private-property owner’s, 
even if the state’s addition of dry sand to the previously submerged 
lands moved the actual high-water line seaward: property upland of 
the erosion-control line remained in the hands of the property owner, 
 44. See id. at 2600 (majority opinion) (describing the initial determination by the Florida 
District Court of Appeal in Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, 27 So. 3d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010), that the plaintiff’s 
waterfront-property rights had been taken). 
 45. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011–.45 (West 2006). 
 46. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.041(1) 
(requiring “any person, firm, corporation, county, municipality, township, special district, or any 
public agency” to obtain a permit from the Department of Environmental Protection before 
undertaking erosion-control projects); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.101(1) (providing that the state 
“may authorize appropriations to pay up to 75 percent of the actual costs for restoring and 
nourishing a critically eroded beach,” but noting that the local government “shall be responsible 
for the balance of such costs”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.161(1) (“The department shall develop 
and maintain a comprehensive long-term management plan for the restoration and maintenance 
of the state’s critically eroded beaches . . . .”). 
 47. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2598; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Internal 
Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987) (acknowledging 
Florida’s adoption of “the common law rule that a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of 
the ordinary high water mark on navigable waters”). 
 48. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599. The Court and the parties simply 
assumed for the purposes of the litigation that the erosion-control line in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment had been set at the preexisting high-water line. Id. at 2599 n.2. 
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and any newly created land on the seaward side of the line belonged 
to the state.49 
The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation comprising beachfront 
landowners in the city of Destin whose properties abutted areas 
designated for an erosion-control project.50 After an unsuccessful 
administrative claim, the plaintiff brought a takings challenge in 
Florida’s District Court of Appeal, claiming that the state’s 
application of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act to the 
landowners’ properties, without compensation, would 
unconstitutionally deprive them of two littoral rights that the plaintiff 
argued had been traditionally conferred on beachfront landowners by 
Florida’s common law: the right to enjoy any additions to their land 
caused by the accretion of dry sand and the right to maintain 
continuous contact between their property and the water.51 The 
appeals court agreed with the plaintiff that the statute had 
extinguished both of these rights unconstitutionally, and it remanded 
the case to the Department of Environmental Protection for the 
necessary eminent domain proceedings.52 The court also certified for 
the Florida Supreme Court the question of the statute’s 
constitutionality in light of the plaintiff’s takings claim.53 
 49. Id. at 2599. 
 50. Id. at 2600. 
 51. Id. According to the Court, an “accretion” of sand is distinct from an “avulsion” in 
Florida law, in that the former refers to a process that occurs “gradually and imperceptibly—
that is, so slowly that one could not see the change occurring, though over time the difference 
became apparent,” whereas the latter describes alterations of the land caused by sudden and 
noticeable events. Id. at 2598; see also Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d at 936 (defining accretion as 
“the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land along the shore or bank of a body of 
water” and avulsion as “the sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the 
water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream”). 
 52. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 
(Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 
S. Ct. 2592 (2010); see also Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.141 (West 
2006) (requiring eminent domain proceedings if an erosion-control project “cannot reasonably 
be accomplished without the taking of private property”). 
 53. The appeals court originally framed the question as an as-applied constitutional 
challenge. Save Our Beaches, 27 So. 3d at 60–61. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the 
question as a facial challenge, but it limited its analysis “to the context of restoring critically 
eroded beaches under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act.” Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). The state court 
proceedings apparently addressed the statute’s constitutionality not under the federal 
Constitution but under the Florida constitution, which, as the Supreme Court later noted, 
WHEELOCK IN PRINTER PROOF 10/13/2011  9:52:12 AM 
2011] EVERY GRAIN OF SAND 445 
 
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that no taking had 
transpired.54 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the crucial 
distinction between accretions and avulsions at Florida common law: 
whereas littoral property owners had always been entitled to any 
gradual additions to their land occasioned by the steady, sustained 
process of accretion, more abrupt additions or diminutions—
avulsions—were understood not to alter the preexisting boundary 
between state-owned and privately owned property.55 As a result, the 
court reasoned, Florida case law made clear that a private owner 
simply had no right to additions by avulsion to begin with, so the state 
could legally claim whatever land surfaced seaward of the original 
high-water line through avulsive events.56 The addition of dry sand to 
submerged lands in the course of the state’s own erosion-control 
efforts was to be treated merely as the manmade equivalent of a 
natural avulsion, thereby placing the statute in harmony with 
traditional principles of common law.57 As to the plaintiff landowners’ 
asserted right of contact between their land and the water, the court 
explained that this entitlement had never been recognized as a 
freestanding property right under Florida common law, but was 
simply an ancillary benefit intended to protect a littoral owner’s right 
to access the water, a right that the statute did not infringe.58 Having 
thus satisfied itself that the Beach and Shore Preservation Act took 
nothing that actually belonged to the plaintiff, the Florida Supreme 
Court quashed the remand of the appeals court.59 
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision left the plaintiff in the 
awkward position of wishing to pursue its takings claim in federal 
court but of lacking a statute or executive action to challenge.60 The 
contains a takings clause, FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6, cl. a, similar to that found in the Fifth 
Amendment. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600 n.3. 
 54. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1116. 
 55. Id. at 1116–17. 
 56. Id. at 1117. 
 57. See id. (“Like the common law doctrine of avulsion, the Act authorizes the State to 
reclaim its storm-damaged shoreline by adding sand to submerged sovereignty lands.”). 
 58. See id. at 1120 (“[B]ecause the Act safeguards access to the water and because there is 
no right to maintain a constant boundary with the water’s edge, the Act, on its face, does not 
unconstitutionally eliminate the ancillary right to contact.”). 
 59. Id. at 1121. 
 60. The scenario would have more closely resembled a conventional takings claim if the 
Florida Supreme Court had merely upheld the erosion-control law and denied compensation 
without resorting to the rationale that the plaintiff landowners had never enjoyed their asserted 
property rights in the first place. In that event, the plaintiff simply would have had a ripe claim 
that either the statute or the state’s execution of the statute violated the Takings Clause. Cf. 
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disagreement in the state courts had been not so much over the scope 
or meaning of the regulation itself, but instead over whether the 
regulated interests met the threshold definition of property—or, more 
specifically, met the definition of the plaintiff’s property.61 The 
plaintiff landowners’ only conceivable recourse, therefore, was to 
argue that the Florida Supreme Court itself had extinguished their 
property rights in violation of the Takings Clause by redefining as not 
theirs something that previously had been theirs.62 Accordingly, the 
landowners’ contention before the U.S. Supreme Court was that their 
right to addition by accretion and their right to direct contact with the 
water had been judicially eliminated.63 
In a decision endorsed by all eight deliberating Justices, the 
Supreme Court sorted through the body of relevant Florida 
precedents and unequivocally rejected that argument: the state 
supreme court’s decision was a taking of neither such interest.64 The 
asserted right to accretion, the Court explained, was limited by “[t]wo 
core principles of Florida property law.”65 The first of these principles 
was that “the State as owner of the submerged land adjacent to 
littoral property has the right to fill that land, so long as it does not 
interfere with the rights of the public and the rights of littoral 
landowners.”66 And the second was that the state, not a private 
landowner, is entitled to any new dry land created by an avulsion 
seaward of the original boundary between state and private 
property.67 The fact that the state’s erosion-control project itself was 
FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 209–10 & n.7 (discussing the traditional ripeness requirements 
for takings claims and offering Lucas, among other cases, as an instance in which the Court has 
appeared to relax those requirements slightly). 
 61. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d at 1107–09 (summarizing relevant 
provisions of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act); Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 52–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (providing a similar outline of the 
statutory scheme), quashed sub nom. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 
So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 62. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2600 (2010) (“Petitioner sought rehearing on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision itself effected a taking of the Members’ littoral rights . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 63. Id. at 2610–11. 
 64. Id. at 2613. 
 65. Id. at 2611. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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the source of the avulsion in this case did not matter.68 The right to 
accretion simply never entitled the plaintiff to any of the property 
claimed by the state under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act.69 
The Court similarly agreed with the Florida Supreme Court that the 
statute had not taken the property owners’ right to direct contact with 
the water because no such right had ever existed.70 Thus, to the extent 
that the state court’s decision was “consistent with . . . background 
principles of state property law,”71 it had not 
“contravene[d] . . . established property rights”72 and could not be 
considered a judicial taking. 
Justice Breyer, in a concurrence joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
made clear that he believed this brief consultation of Florida law was 
all that should have been needed to reject the plaintiff’s claim; the 
plurality’s further step of entertaining the extension of the Takings 
Clause to state judicial decisions, he suggested, was not just 
superfluous, but perilous.73 To Justice Scalia and the rest of the 
 68. Id. The Court supported this conclusion with an earlier Florida Supreme Court case in 
which the state was held to retain ownership over a previously submerged lakebed that had 
dried up following the state’s draining of the lake. See id. (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 
287 (Fla. 1927)). 
 69. See id. at 2612 (“[The Florida Supreme Court] did not abolish the Members’ right to 
future accretions, but merely held that the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration 
project, because the doctrine of avulsion applied.”). 
 70. The Court seemed to rely especially on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Martin 
v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927), for the proposition that an avulsive event, even if caused by 
the state itself, would not alter the preexisting boundaries between state-owned and privately 
owned property. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (“Perhaps state-created 
avulsions ought to be treated differently from other avulsions insofar as the property right to 
accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior Florida law makes such a distinction, and Martin 
suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the contrary.”). Curiously, the Florida Supreme Court had 
made no mention of Martin. See id. (acknowledging that “the opinion does not cite Martin and 
is not always clear on this point”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2613. 
 73. See id. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring) (warning that the plurality’s approach, if 
adopted by the Court, “would invite a host of federal takings claims without the mature 
consideration of potential procedural or substantive legal principles that might limit federal 
interference in matters that are primarily the subject of state law”). One doctrinal candidate for 
refereeing judicial takings claims, proposed by the Florida government, would be to inquire 
whether a state court property decision had a “fair and substantial basis,” an inquiry imported 
from the Court’s adequate-and-independent-state-grounds jurisprudence. See id. at 2608 
(plurality opinion) (discussing the “fair and substantial basis” standard). Justice Scalia and the 
plurality appeared to reject this standard; Justice Breyer was agnostic. Compare id. (“A test 
designed to determine whether there has been an evasion [of a federal-law ground] is not 
obviously appropriate for determining whether there has been a taking of property.”), with id. 
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plurality, which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas 
and Alito, such a noncommittal position was a logical impossibility: 
one could not dismiss a judicial takings challenge without either first 
“knowing what standard it has failed to meet” or else disavowing the 
existence of judicial takings altogether.74 Opting for the former task, 
the plurality explained its view that the agreed-upon absence of any 
judicial taking in this case ought not prevent the Court from affirming 
the potential operation of the Takings Clause upon state judiciaries in 
future cases.75 And thus, after concluding from both constitutional 
text76 and precedent77 that the Fifth Amendment’s safeguard against 
takings makes no distinctions as to which branch of government 
performs the taking, the plurality announced what it regarded as the 
proper formulation: “If a legislature or a court declares that what was 
once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has 
taken that property, no less than if the State had physically 
appropriated it or destroyed its value by regulation.”78 
The plurality’s enlistment of the Takings Clause to rein in state 
judicial decisions that destroy established property rights was 
troubling to Justice Kennedy, who, in a concurrence joined by Justice 
Sotomayor, contended that the same work could be done with equal 
effectiveness by substantive or procedural due process.79 Justice 
Scalia’s opinion rejected both possibilities outright: using procedural 
at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I do not claim that all of these conclusions are unsound. I do 
not know.”). 
 74. Id. at 2603 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer’s willingness to reject the plaintiff’s claim 
without confirming or denying the very possibility of a judicial taking was lampooned by the 
plurality as “reminiscent of the perplexing question how much wood would a woodchuck chuck 
if a woodchuck could chuck wood?” Id. 
 75. See id. (recounting instances in which the Court has “recognized the existence of a 
constitutional right, or established the test for violation of such a right (or both), and then gone 
on to find that the claim at issue fails”). 
 76. See id. at 2601 (“The Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific 
branch or branches.”). 
 77. See id. at 2601–02 (finding support for a judicial takings doctrine in PruneYard and 
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)). 
 78. Id. at 2602. 
 79. See id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Due Process Clause, in both its 
substantive and procedural aspects, is a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial power.”). 
One consideration that seemed to give Justice Kennedy special pause was the possibility that 
the Takings Clause might permit courts to undertake otherwise egregious redefinitions of 
property rights so long as the compensation requirement were satisfied. See id. at 2616 (arguing 
that the idea of judicial takings “would give judges new power and new assurance that changes 
in property rights that are beneficial, or thought to be so, are fair and proper because just 
compensation will be paid”). 
WHEELOCK IN PRINTER PROOF 10/13/2011  9:52:12 AM 
2011] EVERY GRAIN OF SAND 449 
 
due process would “impose judicially crafted separation-of-powers 
limitations upon the States” with no doctrinal foundation for any such 
limitations,80 and using substantive due process would threaten to 
“propel[] us back to what is referred to (usually deprecatingly) as ‘the 
Lochner era.’”81 Scalia probably had the better of these exchanges,82 
but Kennedy’s concerns seemed tempered by an understandable 
hesitancy to embark on a jurisprudential tack for which few 
meaningful guideposts exist.83 Even assuming that Scalia was correct 
that the Due Process Clause84 is ill suited to serve as an antitakings 
instrument, at least the clause’s application to property interests is 
more fully developed than any existing judicial takings doctrine.85 
After all, a reasonably perceptive reader of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment’s plurality opinion may harbor some uncertainty as to 
what standards the Court might adopt in future judicial takings cases, 
beyond the bare assertion that destroying “an established right of 
private property” without compensation is unconstitutional.86 
Judicial takings, then, is a concept in need of some elaboration. 
Given the absence of Justice Stevens from Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, appraising the potential of a judicial takings doctrine 
to stagnate the development of the common law seems an 
appropriate, if slightly quixotic, task. The first respect in which such a 
doctrine might conceivably do so is by assigning a fixed, normative 
meaning to property in the first instance, literally constitutionalizing a 
common-law definition of property.87 A second possibility is that, 
 80. Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion). 
 81. Id. at 2606. 
 82. One particularly potent sally was Justice Scalia’s remark that, under Justice Kennedy’s 
procedural due process proposal, “the citizen whose property has been judicially redefined to 
belong to the State would presumably be given the Orwellian explanation: ‘The court did not 
take your property. Because it is neither politically accountable nor competent to make such a 
decision, it cannot take property.’” Id. at 2605. 
 83. See id. at 2617–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is not wise, from an institutional 
standpoint, to reach out and decide questions that have not been discussed at much length by 
courts and commentators.”). 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 85. See id. at 2615 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and Board of Regents 
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), as demonstrative of the Court’s treatment of 
property rights under the Due Process Clause); cf. Merrill, supra note 4, at 934 (“The extensive 
jurisprudence seeking to define property for procedural due process purposes has no 
counterpart in the law arising under the Takings Clause.”). 
 86. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion). 
 87. For a classic iteration of the criticism that the Court has mistakenly prescribed the 
common law as a constitutional baseline in various areas of its jurisprudence, including takings, 
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even without officially endorsing any such definition as a 
constitutional requisite, the Court might afford too little deference to 
state court interpretations of property law when deciding takings 
claims, especially in those hard cases in which the state-law 
precedents are sparse, ambiguous, or conflicting.88 Each of these two 
prospects warrants separate analysis, with special attention owed to 
both the Court’s precedent in the takings realm and the specific 
language employed by the plurality in Stop the Beach Renourishment. 
II.  SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES IN DEFINING PROPERTY: 
POSITIVISM WITH A COMMON-LAW FAILSAFE? 
As suggested by Lucas’s discussion of background principles, 
courts evaluating takings claims will almost inevitably be forced to 
grapple with the question of whether the object of an alleged taking is 
indeed property and, if so, exactly how far the plaintiff’s interests in 
that property originally extended.89 This question is commonly 
treated as a threshold problem in a wide variety of takings cases,90 and 
Stop the Beach Renourishment suggests that it will be routinely 
encountered in the judicial takings context as well.91 
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). Professor 
Sunstein contends that the chief sin of Lochner was its assumption that common-law rights 
represented a genuinely neutral backdrop rather than the product of legal and political 
judgments, an assumption that led the Court to treat any departure from common-law principles 
or entitlements as constitutionally suspect. See id. at 874 (arguing that “[f]or the Lochner Court, 
neutrality, understood in a particular way, was a constitutional requirement” and that 
“[g]overnmental intervention was constitutionally troublesome, whereas inaction was not”). 
Subsequent scholarship has reexamined Professor Sunstein’s central thesis, and has disputed 
whether the Court in the Lochner era actually viewed the traditional common law as an 
inviolable baseline. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2003) (challenging the notion that Lochner proceeded from any desire to entrench the common 
law as a constitutionally required status quo). 
 88. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1532–34 (identifying and discussing “at least three types 
of legal indeterminacy” that may render the interpretation and demarcation of property rights 
more difficult under state law). 
 89. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original 
Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1639 
(1988) (“Resolving the taking question . . . requires identifying a legitimate basis for choosing 
one definition of private property over another.”). 
 90. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39, at 326–27 (pointing out that courts have 
conducted background-principles analyses as a threshold matter not only in cases of total loss of 
economic value, but also in cases of permanent physical occupation and in cases of regulatory 
action). 
 91. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (summarizing the relevant 
background principles of Florida law that govern littoral property and finding the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision compatible with those principles). 
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Regrettably, case law and commentators have failed thus far to 
produce a uniform, reliable method for defining what qualifies as 
property under the Takings Clause.92 The challenge in producing such 
a method might be likened to that faced by Odysseus in charting a 
course between Scylla and Charybdis.93 At one end of the spectrum 
lies the prospect that Justice Stevens so feared: namely, that of 
reading into the Constitution a single, static definition of property 
derived from the traditional substance of the common law.94 At the 
opposite end lies the possibility of adopting a purely positivist 
conception of property, such that the term “property” in the Takings 
Clause would represent little more than a placeholder for whatever 
interests or entitlements a state government is willing to confer at any 
given time, whether through the common law or through other 
sources such as statutes.95 Each extreme is accompanied by its own 
cluster of theoretical difficulties. 
 92. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1523 n.277 (“It is fair to say . . . that the question of 
what property means in the takings context has not been rigorously analyzed by scholars and 
judges—despite the fact that it would seem central to any formulation of a coherent takings 
doctrine.”). But see Merrill, supra note 4, at 969 (arguing that the Court’s more recent 
jurisprudence can plausibly be read to yield “a federal patterning definition for takings purposes 
that would ask whether nonconstitutional sources of law confer an irrevocable right on the 
claimant to exclude others from specific assets” (emphasis omitted)). 
 93. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. 12, ll. 81–136 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking 1996) 
(portending the hero’s treacherous navigation between Scylla, the “yelping horror,” her many 
fangs “armed to the hilt with black death,” and “awesome Charybdis,” who three times a day 
“gulps the dark water down” before she vomits it up). 
 94. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN 20–24 (1985) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2) 
(proposing Blackstone’s formulation—under which property consists of exclusive control, 
enjoyment, and transferability of one’s acquisitions without any outside interference—as the 
most appropriate definition of property under the Constitution). As a corollary to enshrining a 
Blackstonian, common-law conception of property, Professor Epstein’s position would allow the 
exercise of the police power—and thus the exemption of the state from the requirement of 
compensation—only in those instances in which government action is necessary to prevent a 
common-law injury such as nuisance. See id. at 111 (“In a word, the police power gives the state 
control over the full catalogue of common law wrongs involving force and misrepresentation, 
deliberate or accidental, against other persons, including private nuisances.”). 
 95. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 949–50 (describing “pure positivism” as an entrenched 
legacy of legal realism and characterizing it as the proposition that “[p]roperty means whatever 
the nonconstitutional decisionmakers say it means, or whatever the nonconstitutional 
decisionmakers choose legally to protect as a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’” (quoting Bd. of 
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972))). 
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A. Problems with Adopting an Authorized Constitutional Definition 
of “Property” 
The Takings Clause does not, of its own force, foreclose the 
possibility that the meaning of “property” might be defined according 
to some fixed normative ideal.96 Professor Richard Epstein’s 
preferred course, which would be to “take the meaning of private 
property from ordinary usage,”97 is an elegant expression of the 
normative model, one whose strength proceeds from its simplicity.98 
But the matter still remains that “ordinary usage” must be 
determined along some lines. If originalism were to serve as the main 
interpretive criterion, then property might mean no more than what it 
meant under the common law at a certain historical moment.99 Such 
an approach would almost certainly fail to extend a sufficient measure 
of protection to an institution whose protean nature allows it to 
assume as many novel configurations as human needs and ingenuity 
will accommodate.100 If the Court instead annunciated a formulation 
of constitutional property without any explicit historical anchor, it 
might risk being seen as engaging in something resembling economic 
substantive due process,101 or, perhaps even worse, as resurrecting the 
discarded concept of a “federal general common law.”102 
 96. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1523–24 (“The available shards of history could be used 
to argue for either a positive definition or for a normative definition under which property 
would be defined by the Constitution itself.”). 
 97. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 23. 
 98. This simplicity would arguably spare the Court a great deal of time and effort in 
attempting to extrapolate the precise scope of property rights from state law. See Thompson, 
supra note 3, at 1524 (arguing that, under a normative definition of property, “it would be 
unnecessary to determine what the law was and how, if at all, it has changed,” and that instead, 
“[a]ny governmental action that significantly interferes with the normative constitutional image 
of property would raise takings concerns”). 
 99. Indeed, one historical account of the Takings Clause advances the position that the 
clause, as originally understood, actually provided less protection to private-property owners 
than subsequent takings jurisprudence did, not more. See William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 
785 (1995) (“Even after the establishment of a compensation requirement, it applied only to 
interference with physical ownership, and government routinely acted in ways that diminished 
the value of private property without providing compensation.” (emphasis added)). 
 100. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 945 (emphasizing the dynamic potential of property and 
speculating that a historically static definition would frustrate efforts to solve modern 
problems). 
 101. This notion seems to have been the basic thrust of Justice Marshall’s observations in 
PruneYard, see PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (warning against a return to the Lochner era), as well as Justice Stevens’s later 
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The chance that a fully normative, fully prescriptive model of 
property would gain any traction within a judicial takings doctrine 
seems especially remote given the fact that positivism, at least in 
name, has been the ascendant principle of constitutional property 
since the Court’s decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth.103 That case furnished the fundamental rule that property rights 
“are not created by the Constitution,” but rather “are created and 
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source such as state law.”104 Roth’s analysis 
was confined to the meaning of property under the Due Process 
Clause, but subsequent decisions such as Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith105 and Phillips v. Washington Legal 
Foundation106 have confirmed its applicability to takings cases as 
well.107 Even PruneYard indicated that the Court was unwilling to 
commit to a strictly normative ideal of property under the Takings 
Clause: refusing to find a per se taking when the California state 
constitution’s right of free speech trumped a property owner’s right of 
exclusion,108 then-Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion accorded 
objections in Lucas, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting verbatim the key passage of Marshall’s PruneYard concurrence). 
 102. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Michelman, supra note 41, 
at 319–20 (suggesting that Justice Scalia’s Lucas decision flirted with the premise that “there is 
just one American background law of property and nuisance . . . that is common to the national 
jurisdiction and all the state jurisdictions,” but ultimately concluding that Lucas’s language 
should not be read as presenting any threat to the Erie doctrine). 
 103. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 104. Id. at 577. 
 105. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
 106. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
 107. See id. at 164 (citing Roth for the proposition that “the Constitution protects rather 
than creates property interests”); Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 161 (quoting Roth’s positivist mantra 
directly); Thompson, supra note 3, at 1524 (“When faced directly with the question of whether 
the takings protections embody a normative ideal of property independent of state law, . . . the 
Court has repeatedly responded negatively.”); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. But 
see Merrill, supra note 4, at 958 (arguing that the definition of property under the Takings 
Clause is actually narrower and is closer to a traditional common-law formulation than the 
definition of property under the Due Process Clause). 
 108. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–83 (1980). The Court’s decision in 
PruneYard appeared to address only whether the California constitution itself performed the 
equivalent of a legislative taking—not whether the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
that constitution had so diverged from established precedent that the interpretation could be 
classified as a taking. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1470 & n.89 (discussing the Court’s 
confusion over precisely what kind of governmental action was at dispute in PruneYard). The 
plurality in Stop the Beach Renourishment, of course, reads PruneYard as leaving open the 
possibility that a state court decision might be enough at odds with state-law precedent as to 
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virtually no weight to the fact that the plaintiff’s property had been 
subject to a temporary physical invasion.109 The implication was that a 
state should be considered free, within reasonable limits, to adopt 
restrictions on property use that override traditional common-law 
rationales such as nuisance prevention.110 Even setting aside the 
theoretical and methodological shortcomings of a purely common-law 
approach like Professor Epstein’s, the presumption that property is 
essentially a creature of positive law occupies too conspicuous a place 
in the Court’s jurisprudence to forecast its total repeal under any 
potential judicial takings regime.111 
B. Hazards of the Positivist Method 
If the Court has disclaimed any reliance on an entirely 
substantive account of property when analyzing takings claims, it has 
also hedged its commitment to positivism in a number of important 
ways.112 To at least a limited extent, the very existence of the Takings 
Clause would appear to require the adoption of some neutral baseline 
definition of property; after all, if “property” were assumed to be an 
infinitely malleable construct of positive law susceptible to “perpetual 
legislative redefinition,”113 then it would be difficult to imagine how 
property could ever truly be “taken” by government regulation.114 
Justice Marshall hinted at this problem in his PruneYard concurrence, 
immediately after airing his qualms about freezing the common law, 
constitute “taking by judicial action.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 109. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84 (“In these circumstances, the fact that [protesters] may 
have ‘physically invaded’ appellants’ property cannot be viewed as determinative.”). But see 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982) (positing a 
“constitutional distinction between a permanent occupation and a temporary physical 
invasion”). 
 110. Cf. Blais, supra note 41, at 50 & n.203 (“[S]tates, not the federal government, have 
traditionally established the scope and limits of private property rights . . . .” (citing PruneYard, 
447 U.S. at 84)). The question of whether a state judiciary can suddenly revise its interpretation 
of the state constitution and be entirely free of takings liability is, of course, a separate matter. 
 111. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 943 (“The Roth axiom . . . has far too much gravitational 
force for the Court to repudiate it entirely.”). 
 112. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1526 (arguing that the Court’s professed positivism 
does not align with what is really “an amalgam of positivist and normative approaches”). 
 113. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 65. 
 114. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 87, at 913 (“The takings clause . . . was built on a belief in 
the meaning and importance of private property, and it would be difficult to read that clause in 
the fashion of [West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),] without reading it out of 
the Constitution.”). 
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when he wrote that “serious constitutional questions might be raised 
if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law 
rights in some general way.”115 Carried to its extreme, the positivist 
view also poses precisely the opposite hazard: that of transforming 
practically every state-backed entitlement into a constitutionally 
protected property right under the Takings Clause, including a great 
many that never would have been recognized as property either at 
traditional common law or in everyday experience.116 The Court’s 
decision in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft117 provides 
just one glimpse of this hazard. In that case, state judicial precedents 
forbade public utilities from terminating service to a customer except 
for cause.118 Those precedents, the Court held, conferred a protected 
property interest upon customers in their utility services for due 
process purposes.119 
Perhaps cognizant of the logical extremes of the positivist 
method, the Court has sought solid ground that might help to rescue 
property as both a meaningful and a manageable concept in the 
takings arena. Far from conceding the dominance of positivism, these 
cases have treated property as possessing discrete substantive 
characteristics independent of the contours of state or even federal 
law. To cite one notable example, Lucas’s establishment of a per se 
takings rule for the deprivation of all economically beneficial use of 
 115. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 93–94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall may 
actually have had the Due Process Clause in mind more than the Takings Clause, see id. at 93 
(arguing that “life, liberty, and property” must not be defined solely in positivist terms), but his 
point is germane to a discussion of takings nevertheless. In any event, Marshall agreed with the 
Court’s holding that no core constitutional rights had been abrogated. Id. at 94. Professor 
Epstein’s reasoning makes the case seem closer than the Court’s or Marshall’s opinion might 
suggest. See EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 65–66 (disputing whether the freedom of speech “gives 
the appellee the right to appropriate the land of another for his own use, any more than the 
First Amendment gives a political candidate the right to use his neighbor’s telephone free of 
charge”). 
 116. One term for this phenomenon is the “positivist trap,” which Professor Thomas Merrill 
describes as springing up “whenever nonconstitutional law generates either too little property or 
too much property relative to some independent norm that is important to the Court.” Merrill, 
supra note 4, at 892. 
 117. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 118. Id. at 11–12. 
 119. Id.; cf. FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 488 (“[C]ould affording constitutional 
protection to whatever entitlement a state creates, no matter how unimportant, give rise to a 
flood of due process claims asserting the deprivation of quite trivial interests?”). 
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land might best be read as an explicit reaction against the notion that 
all property rights are enjoyed solely as a matter of legislative grace.120 
The per se rule for cases involving permanent physical 
occupation adopted earlier in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp.121 similarly lines up on the normative rather than the 
positivist side of the ledger.122 In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,123 the 
Court further indicated that the freedom from “severe retroactive 
liability” may, in some cases, constitute a property interest that is 
guarded by the Takings Clause.124 In that case, the Court held that a 
1992 congressional statute that required the plaintiff company to pay 
health benefits to workers it had employed decades earlier—despite 
the fact that the company had agreed to no such obligation under the 
original employment contracts—was a regulatory taking.125 
The holding of Eastern Enterprises gives reason to doubt that the 
infinite mutability of the positive law might ever qualify as a 
legitimate background principle of property rights.126 Indeed, it seems 
to borrow more from a variation of Professor Epstein’s libertarian 
thesis that “[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of liability 
rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the 
state.”127 The Court’s scrutiny of retroactive liability in the takings 
realm bespeaks a fundamentally normative conception of what 
property ownership ought to mean, one that lies somewhere outside 
 120. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992) (arguing that although 
a property owner in many settings may expect the use of his personal property to be revised or 
restricted by the state from time to time, even to the point of total destruction of its economic 
worth, real property is much too rooted in the “historical compact recorded in the Takings 
Clause” to be subjected to any such “implied limitation” on its use and value). 
 121. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 122. See id. at 435 (asserting that in cases of permanent physical occupation of a plaintiff’s 
property, “the government does not simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property 
rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand”). 
 123. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
 124. Id. at 528. 
 125. Id. at 503–04; Merrill, supra note 4, at 900–01. 
 126. Professor Frank Michelman, writing in response to Lucas, speculates whether, on 
remand, the state court might be able to invoke the common law’s inherent capacity for change 
as a suitable justification for dismissing a takings claim when government action made unlawful 
what had previously been lawful. See Michelman, supra note 41, at 316–17 (imagining a possible 
remand decision hinging on the malleability of state property law). As Professor Barton 
Thompson points out, however, even before Lucas the Court had “never suggested that the 
government can protect itself against a regulatory takings claim simply by reserving the general 
right to reallocate property rights.” Thompson, supra note 3, at 1529. 
 127. EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 95. 
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the currents of the positive law.128 It is also consonant with the Court’s 
prior disavowal of purely conditional property interests under the 
Due Process Clause, itself a maneuver designed to resist the corrosive 
dangers of all-out positivism by undergirding constitutional property 
with some independent content.129 
Finally, also in the due process context, the Court has sought a 
means to avoid generating too much property using the positivist 
route. By asserting, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,130 that “[t]he hallmark of a 
protected property interest is the right to exclude others,”131 the Court 
announced a tenet that creates tension with Roth’s positivist regime, 
and that might even erect a bar against certain kinds of state-law 
entitlements that otherwise would have passed muster.132 
C. The Definitional Approach of Stop the Beach Renourishment 
Against this slightly muddled jurisprudential background, some 
intelligible patterns can be extracted from Justice Scalia’s majority 
and plurality opinions in Stop the Beach Renourishment. The first is 
the Court’s official fidelity to positivism, announced in its opening 
statement that “[g]enerally speaking, state law defines property 
interests,”133 and further advanced by its nuanced exegesis of Florida 
statutory and case law to determine the extent of the plaintiff 
landowners’ antecedent littoral ownership rights.134 A similar attitude 
is revealed in the plurality’s refusal to follow Justice Kennedy’s 
recommendation to use substantive due process rather than the 
Takings Clause to rein in judicial redefinitions of property.135 That 
 128. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 951 (describing Eastern Enterprises as “endors[ing] 
substantive limitations on the meaning of property without making any reference at all to Roth’s 
positivist strategy”). 
 129. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1529 n.301 (acknowledging the Court’s rejection, in 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), of the “bitter with the sweet” 
thesis originally espoused by then-Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)). 
 130. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 131. Id. at 673. 
 132. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 913–14 (noting the potential dissonance between the 
Court’s reasoning in College Savings Bank and the positivist logic behind the “new property”). 
 133. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 
(2010) (citing Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)). 
 134. See id. at 2598–2600, 2611–13 (summarizing the Beach and Shore Preservation Act and 
parsing Florida precedent regarding the rights to accretions and avulsions). 
 135. See id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (rejecting the use of substantive due process instead 
of the Takings Clause). 
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refusal suggests a reluctance to register any definitive 
pronouncements on exactly what, if any, normative image of property 
is required by the Constitution. If the plurality had truly been 
interested in erecting some preferred common-law baseline, it 
probably would not have been so careful to avoid the appearance of 
reviving a Lochner-style economic-libertarian approach.136 The 
Court’s reflexive positivism is summarized perhaps most pithily in 
Scalia’s remark that, even if a more exotic reading of Florida cases 
might produce a more desirable result, the Court was not free to 
pursue it because “[t]he Takings Clause only protects property rights 
as they are established under state law, not as they might have been 
established or ought to have been established.”137 In theory, then, the 
decision should have required nothing more than a straightforward 
explication of Florida precedents. 
At several points in Stop the Beach Renourishment, however, the 
Court appeared to gather authority from sources beyond Florida’s 
positive law to define the property interests at stake. When discussing 
the littoral owner’s antecedent right to accretion, for instance, the 
majority opinion noted that Florida’s rule is “generally in accord with 
well-established common law” and cited two early twentieth-century 
treatises on eminent domain and water rights.138 A similar volume 
from the nineteenth century was employed later in this same 
discussion.139 And when the Court explained that in Florida, “as at 
common law,” avulsions do not result in changes in title, the Court 
cited none other than William Blackstone himself.140 
Although these citations do not, ultimately, do much work for 
the Court’s analysis—Florida court decisions occupy a far greater 
portion of the Court’s attention in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
than any learned treatises—under a purely positivist regime, such 
 136. The plurality’s rejection of the substantive due process option may have been 
motivated more by the simple fact that precedent foreclosed reading economic rights into the 
Due Process Clause and less by a desire to flaunt its positivist bona fides. But even if the 
plurality’s nod to the perils of “the Lochner era,” id., was only a rhetorical move, it was still a 
rhetorical move away from, and not toward, a normative ideal of property. 
 137. Id. at 2612 (majority opinion). 
 138. Id. at 2598 (citing 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS § 62 (1904); 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE 
UNITED STATES § 100 (3d ed. 1909)). 
 139. Id. at 2599 (citing JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS, 
INCLUDING RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATERS TIDAL AND 
INLAND § 158 (1883)). 
 140. Id. at 2598 (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *261–62). 
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references to general common law ought not to appear at all. The 
most innocuous explanation is that these sources, although not strictly 
necessary to decide the takings claim, do serve a useful purpose in 
helping the Court to check its work—that is, they ensure that the 
Court’s reading of Florida’s property law is not grossly aberrant from 
the historical arc of legal thought. A more subversive possibility, one 
likely to activate Justice Stevens’s alarm in Lucas, is that the Court 
might actively be using these independent common-law authorities to 
curb the very meaning of Florida precedent; and that, if Florida 
precedent actually were too dissonant with a Blackstonian definition 
of property for the Court’s taste, then the Blackstonian definition 
itself might be called upon to do work in place of the state’s positive 
law. 
D. The Possibility of a Failsafe 
In its efforts to define property, the Court is likely to fashion a 
role for independent common-law principles that falls somewhere in 
between active engagement and passive comparison with state-law 
precedents. The majority and plurality’s positivist mechanics in Stop 
the Beach Renourishment—the citation to Phillips, the close reading 
of Florida cases, the rejection of substantive due process—are simply 
too forthright and too convincing for any portion of Justice Scalia’s 
opinions to be read as demonstrating a willingness to discard the 
state’s antecedent rules for defining property. But judicial takings 
claims are most likely to arise when a state’s background principles 
are either ambiguous or in conflict.141 In such cases, if the threshold 
question of a plaintiff’s original property interests still demands 
resolution, the Court might be tempted to borrow common-law 
norms from outside the relevant jurisdiction as a kind of 
jurisprudential gap-filler. 
Indeed, something resembling this approach has appeared 
before, in the ostensibly positivist decisions of Webb’s Fabulous 
Pharmacies and Phillips. Both cases involved state regulation that 
asserted public ownership of the interest accrued on private 
accounts—in the former, an interpleader fund holding the purchase 
 141. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1531–32 (highlighting the inevitable indeterminacy of 
positive law and explaining that in judicial takings cases, state courts typically will not see 
themselves as changing the law “so much as clarifying the intent of prior cases, resolving 
inevitable conflicts between separate lines of cases, clearing away confusion and 
misunderstanding, or applying preexisting principles to new settings or conditions”). 
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price of an insolvent corporation,142 and in the latter, Negotiable 
Order of Withdrawal accounts into which attorneys had temporarily 
deposited their clients’ funds.143 Both cases involved state laws that 
yielded no ready answers to the question of who ought to own the 
interest.144 And in both cases, the Court sought to escape the 
muddiness of the positive law by grasping for an old common-law 
chestnut: the rule that ownership of interest follows ownership of the 
principal.145 Because the principal in each case belonged indisputably 
to the private parties, the Court concluded that the interest was, by 
default, private, and not public, property.146 
Webb’s and Phillips thus raise the possibility that, in takings 
cases, the Court might consult the substance of some general common 
law, not as a true alternative to the positive law, but rather as a 
failsafe for those moments when positivism runs dry. How eagerly the 
Court might retreat to that failsafe is a separate matter, one whose 
resolution depends on the level of trust it is willing to place in the 
ability of state courts to decide novel property-law issues reliably and 
fairly. Stop the Beach Renourishment volunteers no explicit treatment 
of that question, chiefly because Florida law on littoral rights 
appeared to be neither ambiguous enough147 nor divergent enough 
from broader common-law doctrines148 to supply the Court with any 
reason for abandoning its official positivism. Justice Scalia’s 
discussion does, however, offer some helpful clues for predicting how 
trusting the Court might be in the future. 
 142. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 157–59 (1980). 
 143. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 161–63 (1998). 
 144. In Webb’s, the problem seemed to be an outright dearth of state court decisions on the 
matter. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1538 (“[T]here was no prior state precedent addressing 
whether the interest at issue was private property . . . .”). In Phillips, the situation was slightly 
trickier, but equally unexplored by precedent: the interest allegedly taken by the state had 
accrued on funds that, absent the state action being challenged, would never have been allowed 
to generate any interest in the first place. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 896 (“Phillips presented 
something of a brainteaser of an issue: whether the fruits of X’s property that may only be 
enjoyed by Y are nevertheless the property of X.”). 
 145. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165; Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 162. 
 146. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172; Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164–65. 
 147. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 
2592, 2611 (2010) (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927), to illustrate that the 
doctrine of avulsion applies even when the state itself is the cause of the avulsion). 
 148. See, e.g., id. at 2598 (finding Florida’s distinction between accretion and avulsion 
generally in accord with that described in 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *261–62). 
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III.  THE PROCEDURAL CHALLENGE IN REVIEWING STATE 
JUDICIAL ACTION: DISCIPLINE OR DEFERENCE? 
As already noted, judicial takings claims, insofar as they might be 
cognizable after Stop the Beach Renourishment, are most likely to 
occur at the margins of the established property law, where rights as 
between parties are not clearly defined or understood but where the 
state court has nevertheless been forced to decide in favor of one 
party and against the other.149 The crucial question for the Court in 
reviewing these claims—even presupposing a vigorously positivist 
outlook on the Court’s part—will be whether the state court decision 
is better read as working a genuine change in the positive law, which 
would amount to an uncompensated taking under the logic of the 
Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality,150 or instead as simply 
offering an accurate, reasonable extension of the existing law to the 
facts at hand, which would not.151 Given the potential malleability of 
the law under a purely positivist system,152 this question will rarely be 
easy to answer.153 If judicial takings cases are to be accepted and 
decided by the Court on any predictable or principled basis,154 some 
 149. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 118 
(“[L]itigation exerts powerful forces to select the most difficult cases for adjudication, no matter 
what the underlying standard.”). In this sense, Stop the Beach Renourishment may not be so 
typical of judicial takings claims, since it demanded little more than a parsing of precedents that 
were relatively plentiful and uncomplicated. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion) (“It is no more 
essential that judges be free to overrule prior cases that establish property entitlements than 
that state legislatures be free to revise pre-existing statutes that confer property 
entitlements . . . .”). 
 151. See id. at 2610 (“A decision that clarifies property entitlements (or the lack thereof) 
that were previously unclear might be difficult to predict, but it does not eliminate established 
property rights.” (emphasis added)). 
 152. See supra Part II.B. 
 153. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1537 (noting that the reviewing court in a judicial 
takings claim will “almost always have to face a claim by the state court that its new decision is 
within the boundaries of prior legal doctrine” and suggesting that positivism, if adopted in its 
purest form, will make it “exceptionally difficult to disagree with the state court”). 
 154. Uncertainty as to what constitutes a judicial change in the property law is likely to 
impose a considerable psychological burden on property holders in general. See id. at 1479–80 
(describing the demoralization caused by “loose ends” in decisions affecting property rights). It 
may also disadvantage poorer or underrepresented citizens, who might be less capable of 
pressuring state courts to leave their property interests alone than more politically influential 
groups. Id. at 1494. 
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“procedural limitations or canons of deference” are required, to 
borrow from Justice Breyer’s concurrence.155 
The choice before the Court is best expressed as a tradeoff 
between instilling a high level of discipline in state courts in their 
reading of precedent and expressing a high degree of deference to 
those courts. Justice Scalia’s Lucas opinion, discussing the state 
court’s interpretation of background principles, seemed to stake out a 
middle ground. It left room for some flexibility in the development of 
the state’s common law—acknowledging that “changed circumstances 
or new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no 
longer so”156—but it also sought to cabin that flexibility with its later 
insistence that the state judiciary’s application of case law must be an 
“objectively reasonable” one.157 As discussed in this Part, Stop the 
Beach Renourishment similarly contained contrasting signals, ones 
that stacked up on different sides of the scale. Which signals end up 
being the most closely heeded may determine the Court’s future 
judicial takings jurisprudence, if it indeed has one. 
A. Abandoning Unpredictability 
One signal that may allay Justice Stevens’s criticism of freezing 
the common law is the plurality’s rejection of the plaintiff’s proposed 
“unpredictability” standard as the basis for knowing when a judicial 
taking has occurred.158 That standard, borrowed from Justice 
Stewart’s 1967 concurrence in Hughes v. Washington,159 would have 
declared as a judicial taking any state court decision that 
“constitute[d] a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of 
relevant precedents.”160 Justice Scalia’s objection was that this 
standard would be both overinclusive and underinclusive: some state 
court decisions might be unpredictable without eliminating property 
 155. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring). But see id. at 
2608 n.9 (plurality opinion) (contending, in response to Justice Breyer, that the Court must 
make independent determinations of “state-court compliance with all constitutional 
imperatives” and that, in any case, the plurality’s standard for judicial takings does allow 
deference to state courts). 
 156. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992); see also Blumm & Ritchie, 
supra note 39, at 336 (exploring Lucas’s accommodation of an “evolving nuisance” takings 
defense). 
 157. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18; see also supra text accompanying note 34. 
 158. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion). 
 159. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). 
 160. Brief of Petitioner at 17, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 
2009 WL 2509219, at *17 (citing Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
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rights, and some judicial eliminations of property rights might not be 
unpredictable.161 
This response displays a keen recognition of the hard legal 
questions with which state courts will usually be confronted at the 
time most judicial takings claims are conceived. After all, in the 
marginal property cases that are most likely to spur subsequent 
takings litigation, a state court will not easily know whether it is 
dealing with an “established right of private property”162 specifically 
because the meaning of relevant precedents is so difficult to 
decipher.163 Removing the unpredictability test will likely allow the 
court to focus on reaching the best result in the dispute at hand, 
rather than forcing it to agonize over whether that result really 
amounts to a sudden development in light of sparse or muddled 
precedents.164 Alternatively, the Stop the Beach Renourishment 
plurality does not stand for the proposition that all such close calls are 
beyond reproach; indeed, its affirmation that federal courts retain 
“the power to decide what property rights exist under state law”165 
indicates that at least some portion of state property decisions might 
be subjected to something approaching de novo review when 
challenged under the Takings Clause.166 
B. State-Level Separation of Powers? 
A rather curious signal in the direction of judicial discipline 
comes from the plurality’s brief consideration of remedies. One of 
Justice Kennedy’s concerns about recognizing judicial takings was 
that state courts might actually revise property entitlements more 
aggressively because the reviewing court’s only weapon would be to 
mandate compensation, effectively turning the state legislature into 
 161. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion). 
 162. Id. at 2602. 
 163. See supra notes 88, 141. 
 164. Indeed, the plurality seemed to believe that relying on unpredictability as the sole 
benchmark of a judicial taking might discourage state courts from bringing needed resolution to 
ambiguities in the existing property law. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 
(plurality opinion) (drawing a distinction between a mere clarification of the law and a judicial 
elimination of established property rights). 
 165. Id. at 2609. 
 166. The plurality opinion intimated that certain questions of state property law might 
simply be so difficult as to place the state court decisions effectively beyond aggressive federal 
review. See id. at 2608 n.9 (discussing the trouble with finding property rights to be 
“established” when state law is unclear). But it did not offer any elaboration on when those 
situations might be said to arise. 
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an involuntary underwriter for the state judiciary’s revisions.167 Justice 
Scalia disagreed: the reviewing court’s response, he wrote, should be 
simply to overturn the offending state court decision, leaving the 
power to effect a compensated taking exclusively in the hands of the 
legislature, “where it has always resided.”168 
Although this exchange technically bore on the question of how 
to redress a judicial taking, not on whether a judicial taking has 
occurred in the first place, the plurality’s rejoinder to Justice Kennedy 
nevertheless bespoke an unmistakable vision of the proper 
assignment of functions among the different branches of government. 
Ironically, that vision is strikingly similar to the very approach the 
plurality refused to entertain under the Due Process Clause: a strict 
separation of state governmental authority, under which “courts 
cannot be used to perform the governmental function of 
expropriation.”169 
Of all the potential options that might be pursued by a reviewing 
court upon a finding of a judicial taking,170 the option advanced by the 
plurality is likely the least hospitable to the idea that courts ought to 
be afforded special latitude in refashioning the law to meet changed 
circumstances.171 Indeed, the plurality’s attitude is far more closely 
aligned with the position that the Takings Clause contemplates a 
careful balancing of utilities by the legislature alone172 and that state 
courts as an institution are in no legitimate position to change the 
common law at all.173 State judges might easily feel constrained in the 
belief that the Court favored such a view. 
 167. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. at 2607 (plurality opinion). 
 169. Id. at 2605. 
 170. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 1513–22 (examining the remedies conceivably available 
to state courts and reviewing courts, including “automatic compensation” and “legislative 
choice”). 
 171. See generally Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39 (chronicling the expansion by state 
courts of numerous common-law doctrines—including nuisance, public trust, natural use, 
navigational servitude, customary rights, water rights, wildlife trust, and Indian treaty rights—to 
dismiss Takings Clause challenges). 
 172. See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, Public Use, and the Perfect Storm: An Essay in 
Honor of Bernard H. Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 620 (2008) (“[The Fifth Amendment’s 
compensation requirement] disciplines government behavior by forcing taxpayers to make 
honest evaluations of whether they receive from acquiring public ownership a benefit 
commensurate with the costs that they impose . . . .”). 
 173. See Huffman, supra note 6, at 23 (“The common law is a formalization of custom, 
meant to evolve as custom evolves, not as judges’ preferences change.”). 
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C. The Plaintiff’s Burden 
Forbidding state courts to change the common law, however, is a 
meaningful stricture only when the law is developed enough that an 
observer can confidently tell when a change has been made. In areas 
in which the law is indeterminate, state courts are likely to reap the 
benefits of what is perhaps the strongest procedural signal sent in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, not just by the plurality but by the 
entire Court: namely, its description of the proper burden of 
persuasion in judicial takings cases. The plaintiff contended that a 
judicial taking must be found by the Court unless the Florida 
government could produce some precedent that directly authorized 
the state to embark upon an uncompensated erosion-control 
project.174 Disagreeing, the Court clarified that the correct 
formulation was precisely the contrary: the judicial takings claim 
would not prevail unless the plaintiff could show that, prior to the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision, the landowners had enjoyed the 
specific property rights that were allegedly taken.175 In other words, 
judicial takings plaintiffs must persuade the reviewing court that the 
state’s positive law was, essentially, unambiguous before the 
complained-of action—and furthermore, that it was unambiguous in 
the direction of investing them with intelligible p
This principle, if honestly applied in future cases, has the 
potential to bestow a significant degree of flexibility on state courts 
interpreting property law at the margins.176 Such flexibility might even 
be enough to bring some comfort to an observer as worried about 
“[a]rresting the development of the common law” as Justice Stevens 
was.177 Admittedly, in situations involving a traditional, widely 
recognized form of property, the plaintiff will have little trouble 
 174. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610–11 (summarizing the plaintiff’s 
theory that a taking had been committed “because no prior Florida decision had said that the 
State’s filling of submerged tidal lands could have the effect of depriving a littoral owner of 
contact with the water and denying him future accretions”). 
 175. See id. at 2611 (“There is no taking unless petitioner can show that, before the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision [in this proceeding], littoral-property owners had rights to future 
accretions and contact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged land.”). 
 176. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion embraced this very hypothesis, arguing that the 
plurality’s proposed test for a judicial taking—“deprivation of an established property right”—
accorded “a considerable degree of deference to state courts.” Id. at 2608 n.9. This deference, 
Scalia reasoned, was derived from the fact that “[a] property right is not established if there is 
doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our own assessment but 
accept the determination of the state court.” Id. 
 177. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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demonstrating the prior existence of the property interest.178 But in 
many cases, particularly those involving more novel forms of property 
or more innovative arrangements of property ownership,179 the law 
will be a frontier, devoid of any clear directive as to where the 
boundaries between various parties’ rights should fall.180 If the Court’s 
unequivocal placement of the burden on the plaintiff in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment is to be believed, then state courts may rest 
easier in the knowledge that their labor of bringing order to the 
unsettled vanguards of property law is sheltered by some procedural 
deference on review. 
Ultimately, the signals issued in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
are still only signals, and they furnish at best an incomplete forecast 
of how aggressive the Court will be in judging whether state courts 
are changing the law or merely clarifying it. Many more procedural 
questions remain to be worked out in the event that the Court decides 
to begin accepting judicial takings claims more forthrightly.181 But 
certain signals at least give reason for supposing that a judicial takings 
doctrine would not, by itself, freeze the common law in its current 
condition. 
 178. Cf. id. at 1016 n.7 (majority opinion) (explaining that the fee simple interest “is an 
estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law”). 
 179. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 180. Webb’s and Phillips, both of which demanded judicial resolution as to the ownership of 
interest on special funds, provide ready examples of cases in which the specific property-law 
questions at issue simply had not been plumbed by any prior court decision. See supra note 144 
and accompanying text. 
 181. One such question is how the burden of persuasion announced by the Court in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment squares with Lucas’s proviso that the onus is on the state to make a 
showing that the background principles of property law place inherent limitations on the 
plaintiff’s title. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1031–32 (requiring South Carolina to demonstrate precedent 
prohibiting the plaintiff’s use of his property). This proviso has generally been understood to 
fashion background principles into an affirmative defense for the government in takings claims. 
See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 39, at 326–27 (interpreting Lucas as requiring the government 
to use background principles as an affirmative defense rather than as placing the burden on the 
claimant). But if, under Stop the Beach Renourishment, the plaintiff must initially show the 
existence of a property right under state law, then background principles will no longer be an 
affirmative defense for the government, in the sense that raising the affirmative defense will 
have become exactly the same thing as refuting the plaintiff’s case in chief: both the plaintiff and 
the defendant will be arguing that background principles yield the favored view of property 
rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
When reduced to its essence, the plurality’s recognition of 
judicial takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment is probably no more 
than a truism, and a fairly inoffensive one at that: when presented 
with the claim that a plaintiff’s property has been taken for public use 
without just compensation, state courts may not play fast and loose 
with the law of property and whittle away the very thing the plaintiff 
seeks to defend. To adopt any other position might threaten to turn 
the Takings Clause into a dead letter, or even to abandon the very 
notion of the rule of law. 
But commentators would not be indulging in a groundless 
fantasy to fear that a judicial takings doctrine, if too haphazardly 
applied, might stunt the development of property law in state courts 
and lead toward an outright constitutionalization of the common law. 
This Note seeks to develop a plausible theoretical explanation for 
how and why such a consequence might flow from judicial takings in 
practice. The freezing of the common law could first assume a 
substantive dimension if the Court were to insist on a specific 
normative baseline as inhering in the definition of property under the 
Takings Clause. And secondly, it could assume a procedural 
dimension if, even in the absence of any such baseline, the Court were 
to maintain a particularly low threshold for determining that a state 
judicial decision actively changes, rather than merely explicates, the 
law of property. Substantively, the reign of positivism is likely to 
continue in cases involving an abundance of clear, thorough state 
precedents. In less settled areas, the Court may be tempted to enlist 
independent common-law norms. Procedurally, state judiciaries are 
unlikely to receive much deference or sympathy for the premise that 
common-law judging requires the flexibility to contradict previous 
case law, but they may at least receive the benefit of the doubt when 
that case law is so ambiguous that the extent of the plaintiffs’ 
property interests is functionally an open question. 
A workable judicial takings doctrine will require the Court to 
bring its slightly contrasting substantive and procedural attitudes into 
equipoise. When state positive law is scarce or nonexistent, for 
instance, should the Court invoke a Blackstonian failsafe and move 
forward with its judicial takings analysis, or should the takings claim 
instead simply stand or fall on the plaintiff’s ability to tease a property 
right out of the state’s judicial tea leaves? Stop the Beach 
Renourishment probably tilts toward the latter option, but the Court’s 
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ratification of the former is not beyond imagination. Such conflicts 
will arise, and must be resolved, where they nearly always are: on the 
margins. The Court’s choices along those outer boundaries may well 
decide the future of the common law of property. Either it will 
become arrested and entrenched, anchored permanently to a static 
ideal, or it will continue to move with the tide of human experience, 
sculpted gradually but surely by the dozens, even hundreds, of 
imperceptible additions and subtractions of precedent, “like every 
sparrow falling, like every grain of sand.”182 
 182. BOB DYLAN, Every Grain of Sand, on SHOT OF LOVE (Columbia Records 1981). 
